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 3 
Introduction 
	
Somalia	has	been	a	failed	state	for	over	two	decades	and	is	beginning	to	fully	recover	as	
a	nation.		Beyond	broader	developmental	issues,	Somalia	has	lagged	because	it	lacked	a	proper	
structure	of	government.		Somalia	has	its	fair	share	of	humanitarian	issues	but	this	academic	
research	paper	is	purely	focused	on	developing	the	Somali	state.		I	acknowledge	Somalia	has	
major	security	issues,	but	before	Somalia	can	effectual	address	her	security	concerns	she	must	
iron	out	her	political	wrinkles.				In	Rethinking	the	Somali	State,	I	focus	on	the	process	and	
procedures	to	achieve	political	stability	by	proposing	an	innovative	model	for	achieving	full	
statehood	for	Somalia:	Vision	2021.		In	addition,	I	propose	policy	solutions	to	help	tackle	the	
major	issues	serving	as	obstacles	to	the	three	goals	that	were	outlaid	in	the	now	defunct	Vision	
2016.		
The	Somali	nation-state,	Somalia,	has	had	two	republics:	(1)	the	Somali	Republic,	1960-
1969,	and	(2)	the	Somali	Democratic	Republic,	1969-1991.		By	the	end	of	2016,	the	Somali	
people	and	the	international	community	were	hoping	to	create	the	Somali	nation-state’s	third	
fully	functioning	republic	through	an	ambitious	plan	called	Vision	20161.		This	plan	
encompassed	three	major	goals:	(a)	federalization	of	Somalia;	(b)	constitutional	revision	and	a	
national	referendum;	and	(c)	one-person	one-vote	national	election.		Though	noble,	Vision	
2016’s	strategy	was	not	palatable	to	the	realities	of	Somalia’s	current	political	climate	and	thus	
                                                
1 Vision 2016’s strategy is being executed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with guidance from United 
Nations Assistant Mission to Somalia (UNSOM).  
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was	a	failure.		Not	one	goal	was	fully	completed.		The	scheduled	presidential	election	was	not	
even	held	by	the	end	of	2016.				
The	Somali	state	was	initially	established	by	an	amalgamation	of	two	former	colonial	
territories,	British	Somaliland	Protectorate	and	Somalia	Italiana,	which	united	in	1960	to	create	
the	Somali	Republic.		The	birth	of	the	Somali	Republic	can	be	traced	back	to	1950	when	the	
United	Nations	administered	Somalia	Italiana	for	ten	years.		Upon	gaining	independence	
Somalia	governed	itself	under	a	multi-party	system	but	this	democratic	experiment	abruptly	
ended	after	nine	short	years.		In	1969,	General	Mohamed	Siad	Bare	executed	a	coup	to	create	
the	Somali	Democratic	Republic	and	governed	it	under	a	communist	system.		After	twenty-one	
years	of	dictatorship,	a	conglomerate	of	clan	militias	over	threw	Siad	Bare	in	1991	leading	to	
the	collapse	of	the	state.			
There	were	many	attempts	to	resuscitate	the	Somali	state	but	all	attempts	were	feeble.		
Success	final	came	on	September	16,	2012,	when	former	President	Hassan	Sheikh	Mohamud	
was	democratically	elected	to	head	Somalia’s	first	post-transitional	government,	the	Federal	
Government	of	Somalia	(FGS),	albeit,	the	FGS	is	governed	by	a	provisional	constitution.		On	
February	8,	2017,	President	Mohamed	Abdullahi	"Farmaajo"	was	elected	as	Somalia’s	new	head	
of	state	for	a	four-year	mandate.		The	FGS	is	working	on	regaining	full	statehood	for	Somalia	
with	the	United	Nations	Assistant	Mission	to	Somalia	(UNSOM)	serving	as	its	international	
guide.			
In	order	to	understand	and	appreciate	Somalia’s	current	political	climate,	and	to	devise	
achievable	solutions,	we	must	analyze	her	modern	sociopolitical	history,	beginning	with	an	
understanding	of	the	importance	of	the	Somali	clan	system,	followed	by	an	historical	analysis	of	
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her	colonial	history.		Additionally,	we	will	thoroughly	discuss	the	Somali	Republic’s	democratic	
experiment	and	briefly	discuss	the	communist	era	of	the	Somali	Democratic	Republic.			
This	historical	analysis	will	provide	valuable	insights	and	lessons	towards	rebuilding	a	
democratic	Somali	state	and	will	provide	a	framework	for	achieving	Vision	2021.		Vision	2021	is	
a	revised	and	enhanced	version	of	Vision	2016,	and	is	accompanied	by	timetables	to	complete	
each	goal.		It	provides	a	bottom-up	approach	to	achieving	full	statehood	for	Somalia	by	the	end	
of	President	Mohamed	Abdullahi	Farmaajo’s	term	in	2021.		There	are	five	goals	in	Vision	2021	
and	each	goal	is	a	building	block	to	achieving	full	statehood	in	moderation.	
Vision	2021	will	accomplish	the	following	goals:	(a)	regional	one-person	one-vote	
elections	for	all	respective	Federal	Member	States;	(b)	Federal	Constitutional	Convention	for	
purposes	of	constitutional	revision;	(c)	national	referendum	for	Somalia’s	new	constitution;	(d)	
establishment	of	a	fully	functioning	Somali	National	Army	and	the	withdrawal	of	the	African	
Union	Mission	in	Somalia	(AMISOM);	and	(e)	one-person	one-vote	national	election.				
	
Methodology	
	
	 My	research	is	based	on	reviewing	and	analyzing	multitudes	of	academic	articles,	books,	
documents	and	reports	concerning	Somali	affairs,	combined	with	my	own	academic	and	
personal	experience	in	Somalia.		My	analysis	seeks	to	clarify	procedures	and	techniques	that	
were	successfully	implemented	to	create	the	Somali	state,	while	identifying	problems	that	
accompanied	its	initial	founding.			
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Rethinking	the	Somali	State	critically	analyzes	the	reasons	behind	Vision	2016’s	failure	
and	critiques	its	application.		Additionally,	it	provides	historical	analysis	on	successful	strategies	
during	Somalia’s	creation,	which	can	be	applied	presently	during	its	recreation.		My	research	
concludes	with	policy	recommendations	to	reestablish	the	Somali	state.			
I.M.	Lewis’s	research	is	most	referenced	because	he	is	the	preeminent	academic	scholar	
on	Somali	studies,	“he	had	been	one	of	the	pioneering	social	scientists	to	chronicle	the	process	
of	state-building	among	Somalis	from	the	mid-1950s	onwards.”2		He	first	visited	the	Somali	
territories	in	1955	for	anthropological	research,3	and	throughout	his	life	continued	to	provide	
valuable	and	reliable	information	on	Somali	studies.		I	frequently	sought	his	unique	insight	by	
evaluating	his	treasure	trove	of	research	on	Somali	affairs.		
	
The	Somali	Clan	System	
	
As	an	ethnic	Somali,	who	was	born	and	raised	in	the	United	States,	I	can	intimately	
attest	to	the	importance	of	the	clan.		It	is	the	Somalis’	social	security	system,	it	is	the	
preeminent	underlying	identifying	factor	of	our	existence,	it	is	our	way	of	life,	and	it	must	be	
considered	in	any	political	plan.		I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	travel	to	Somalia	three	times	in	
                                                
2  Barnes, Cedrick.  [review of the book Milk and peace, drought and war: Somali culture, society and politics: 
essays in honour of I. M. Lewis, by Markus V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling].  International Affairs (Royal Institute 
of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 86, No.6, Post-American Iraq (November 2010), pp. 1453. 
 
3 I.M. LEWIS 1930-2014: A GREAT TREE HAS FALLEN. Samater, S. Said. http://www.wardheernews.com/m-
lewis-1930-2014-great-tree-fallen/  
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my	life,	the	first	trip	being	daqaan	celis,	or	“return	to	culture.”		My	parents	sent	me	to	Somalia	
for	a	summer	to	learn	my	native	culture	intimately.		The	other	two	times	I	visited	Somalia	was	
for	academic	purposes;	the	University	of	Minnesota	School	of	Law’s	Human	Rights	Center	
awarded	me	the	Upper	Midwest	Human	Rights	Fellowship	and	the	Robina	Human	Rights	
Fellowship,	which	allowed	me	to	consider	issues	on	a	more	academic	level.				
Through	these	experiences,	and	my	own	upbringing	as	an	ethnic	Somali,	I	have	come	to	
conclude	that:	to	be	Somali	is	to	belong	to	a	clan.		In	essence,	to	be	Somali	is	to	belong	to	a	clan	
that	other	Somali	clans	regard	as	belonging	to	their	system,	regardless	of	how	big	or	small	that	
clan	is.		If	one	does	not	belong	to	a	recognized	Somali	clan,	then	that	person	is	not	technically	
Somali.		As	I.M.	Lewis	observed,	“[t]he	entire	Somali	population	can	be	comprised	within	one	
vast	genealogy	recording	all	the	relationships	of	the	numerous	patrilineal	descent	groups	into	
which	Somali	society	is	divided	.	.	.	Somali	society	is	thus	an	agnatic	lineage	society	.	.	..”4		
There	are	four	major	Somali	clan	confederations,	the	Big	Four,	(1)	Darood,	(2)	Dir,	(3)	
Hawiye,	and	(4)	Rahaweyn,	and	a	multitude	of	smaller/minority	clans.		All	ethnic	Somalis,	
regardless	of	nationality,	belong	to	one	of	the	Big	Four	or	smaller	clans.		Generally,	every	clan	
confederation	and	its	subunits	live	in	defined	territories,	therefore,	clan	loyalty	is	intrinsically	
tied	to	land.		The	Somali	clan	system	is	governed	by	the	Xeer,	Somali	customary	law.5	Xeer	is	
the	main	dispute	resolution	mechanism	used	between	clans	and	encompasses	legal	doctrines	
                                                
4 Lewis, I.M. (1958).  Modern Political Movements in Somaliland I.  Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 245-46. 
5 Van Notten, Michael.  The Law of the Somalis.  Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 2005. Print. pp. 33. 
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that	govern	life,	liberty,	and	property.6		Clans	have	figureheads	who	serve	as	their	ceremonial	
leaders	with	lifetime	appointments;	these	appointments	are	usually	hereditary.7		
The	Somali	clan	system	places	great	importance	on	elders,	“[a]t	every	level	of	
segmentation	it	is	the	elders	of	the	nomadic	hamlets	who	control	political	relations.”8	This	
explains	why	the	international	community	have	utilized	clan	elders	in	the	process	of	electing	
members	of	Somalia’s	parliament	(House	of	the	People),	both,	in	2012	and	2016.		Without	
authentic	democratic	elections,	clan	elders	are	the	most	legitimate	and	representative	of	
Somalia’s	society.		Due	to	its	paternal	and	agnatic	nature,	the	Somali	clan	system	does	not	
traditionally	empower	its	womenfolk.			
Unlike	most	African	nation-states,	Somalia	is	ethnically	homogenous	but	its	clan	system	
serves	as	its	great	divider.		“African	nationalists	in	most	colonial	states,	because	of	their	multi-
ethnic	character,	did	not	have	the	luxury	of	a	ready-made,	country-wide	local	foundation	for	
nationalism.”9		Somalis,	due	to	their	ethnic,	linguistic,	cultural	and	religious	homogeneity,	were	
endowed	with	a	more	organic	form	of	nationalism	when	compared	to	their	African	
counterparts.10			Somali	nationalism	does	have	an	Achilles	heel,	the	clan	system,	therefore	its	
                                                
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. at 248 
9 Lewis, I.M. (2004) Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox.  Africa (Edinburgh University Press), 
Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.490. 
10 Ibid. 
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ethnic	and	cultural	homogeneity	is	“accompanied	by	a	pervasive	system	of	internal	divisions	
based	on	the	ideology	of	kindship,	and	hence	invisible	.	.	..”11				
	 The	Somali	clan	system	has	its	pros	and	cons,	but	most	experts	acknowledge	that	it	has	
historically	hampered	the	Somali	people’s	social,	economic,	and	political	development.		
However,	if	utilized	correctly	it	can	be	a	tool	that	helps	revamp	the	Somali	state.		The	clan	
system	is	omnipresent	within	the	fabric	of	Somali	society	and	thus	must	be	a	variable	when	
devising	a	political	solution.		
	
The	Colonial	Era	
	
The	British	and	Italians	encountered	the	various	Somali	clans	during	their	colonial	
conquest	of	Africa.		Ironically,	the	Somali	clan	system	assisted	the	European	colonials	in	their	
conquest	for	Somali	territories.		“[D]espite	their	sense	of	cultural	identity,	they	did	not	
constitute	a	single	political	unit.		Foreign	aggression	thus	encountered	not	a	nation-state,	but	a	
congeries	of	disunited	and	often	hostile	clans	.	.	..”12		In	addition	to	the	clan	structure,	the	way	
in	which	the	British	and	Italians	(and	later	the	UN	Trusteeship)	governed	the	northern	and	
southern	parts	of	Somalia,	respectively,	has	had	a	lasting	impact	on	the	development	of	the	
Somali	state.				
	
British	Somaliland	Protectorate		
	
                                                
11 Ibid.  
12 Lewis, I.M.  A Modern History of the Somali.  Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 43. 
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The	British	Empire	laid	claim	to	northern	Somalia,	what	would	become	the	British	
Somaliland	Protectorate,	in	1884.13		The	British	were	able	to	negotiate	with	the	various	clans	
that	resided	in	the	area	due	to	their	fear	of	Abyssinian	(i.e.	Ethiopian)	expansion;	the	Brits	had	
signed	treaty	agreements	with	the	Gadabuursi,	Isaaq,	Issa	and	Warsangeli	clans.14		The	quiddity	
of	the	treaties	stipulated	that	“the	members	of	the	tribal	sections	represented	became	‘British	
Protected	persons’,	and	in	their	lands	(still	to	be	defined)	Britain	was	recognized,	in	return,	as	
the	paramount	power	even	while	ultimate	sovereignty	and	ownership	remained	vested	in	the	
tribes	.	.	.	Legally,	Somaliland	was	never	a	colony.”15	
In	1899,	a	Somali	anti-colonial	movement	known	as	the	Dervish	arose	from	the	
Protectorate	led	by	Sayyid	Muhammad	Abdille	Hassan.16		The	conflict	between	the	Dervishes	
and	the	British	would	last	for	two	decades,	ending	with	the	defeat	of	Abdille	Hassan	in	1920.17	
After	the	defeat	of	the	Dervishes,	the	British	began	to	enhance	their	administrative	capacity	
and	infrastructural	development	in	the	Protectorate.18		“It	is	only	since	the	destruction	of	the	
Mad	Mullah	[Abdille	Hassan]	in	1920	that	the	country	[Protectorate]	has	had	any	real	chance	of	
                                                
13 Millman, Brock.  British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920-1960.  New York: Routledge, 2014. Print.  
pp. 15      
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. at 16.  
16 Lewis, I.M.  A Modern History of the Somali.  Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 68-69. 
17 Ibid. at 80. 
18	Kittermaster, H.B. (Jul., 1928).  British Somaliland.  Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 27, No. 108, pp. 
335-337 
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progressing.”19		Some	of	the	projects	the	British	initiated	were	road	construction	from	the	
coastal	area	to	the	hinterland,	medical	services,	schooling,	drilling	water	wells	and	providing	
veterinarian	services	to	facilitate	the	pastoral	economy	of	the	nomadic	population.20				
	 World	War	II	brought	conflict	to	the	Horn	of	Africa,	where	the	British	and	Italian	empires	
fought	for	supremacy	of	the	region.		Mussolini	captured	the	British	Somaliland	Protectorate	in	
August	1940	and	incorporated	it	into	the	Italian	East	African	Empire,	which	also	included	
Ethiopia,	Eritrea,	and	Somalia	Italiana.21		After	seven	months,	the	British	recaptured	the	
Protectorate,	liberated	Ethiopia	from	Mussolini’s	grips,	and	captured	Somalia	Italiana.22		The	
British	now	had	control	of	both	British	Somaliland	Protectorate	and	Somalia	Italiana,	and	
governed	the	respective	territories	under	a	British	Military	Administration.23		The	British	
governed	Somalia	Italiana	until	1949,	when	it	handed	it	over	to	the	UN	Trusteeship,	keeping	
Somaliland	as	a	Protectorate.24		
The	sociopolitical	development	under	the	British	Somaliland	Protectorate	was	not	as	
intensive	and	sophisticated	as	in	Somalia	Italiana	under	the	new	UN	Trusteeship.25		The	British	
                                                
19 Ibid. at 335.  
20 Lewis, I.M.  A Modern History of the Somali.  Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 104. 
21 Ibid. at 116. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. at 116-17. 
24 Ibid. at 128. 
25 Lewis, I.M. (1958).  Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II.  Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 352. 
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did	not	have	a	policy	of	granting	the	Protectorate	independence	until	December	1958.26		This	is	
the	reason	why	the	Protectorate’s	Somalization	programs	were	initiated	much	later	than	
Somalia	Italiana’s,	whose	independence	was	decided	in	1949.		“According	to	J.H.A.	Watson	
(Foreign	Office),	it	was	impossible	to	maintain	British	rule	over	Somaliland	once	Somalia	
became	independent.		There	was	an	urgent	need,	he	argued,	for	a	rapid	devolution	of	power	to	
the	Protectorate	.	.	.	Somaliland	was	to	be	granted	its	independence	in	1960,	which	would	
coincide	with	the	date	of	independence	of	the	Trusteeship	Territory	[Somalia	Italiana].”27							
The	first	democratic	election	took	place	in	February	1960,	four	months	prior	to	
independence,	for	the	Protectorate’s	Legislative	Council.28		The	two	main	political	parties	of	the	
Protectorate	were	the	Somaliland	National	League	(SNL)	and	the	United	Somali	Party	(USP).29		
The	initial	political	platform	of	the	SNL	did	not	promote	unity	with	Somalia	Italiana,	but	rather	
advocated	for	the	Protectorate	to	be	its	own	country,	a	“policy	of	independence	within	the	
Commonwealth.”30		In	addition,	it	was	representative	of	the	Isaaq	clan	centered	around	
Hargeisa,	Berbera,	and	Burco.31		The	political	platform	for	the	USP	was	for	the	Protectorate	to	
                                                
26 Mohamed, Jama (2002).  Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland.  The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 474, pp. 1198.  
27 Ibid. at 1998-99  
28 Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. Bildhaan, Vol. 2, pp. 30. 
29 Lewis, I.M. (1958).  Modern Political Movements in Somaliland II.  Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 347. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox.  Africa (Edinburgh University Press). 2004, 
Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.499 
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merge	with	Somalia	Italiana	to	form	the	Somali	Republic.		It	was	representative	of	the	
Gadabuursi,	Dhulbahante,	and	Warsangeli	clans,	respectively	centered	around	Borama,	Las	
Anod,	and	Las	Qoray.32			
Women	were	not	offered	suffrage	in	this	election,	which	caused	concern	for	the	British	
in	the	Protectorate.33	Sir	Douglas	Hall,	late	Governor	of	the	Protectorate,	explained,	“One	of	
our	main	worries	was	how	the	women	would	behave.		They	had	no	vote,	but	they	were	
surprisingly	politically-conscious,	and	there	is	nothing	that	an	administrator	dislikes	more	than	a	
riot	of	women.		However,	the	Somalis	themselves	decided	that	the	election	should	be	orderly,	
and	it	was.		There	were	no	incidents	worthy	of	the	name	and	for	the	whole	of	February	17th	not	
a	woman	was	to	be	seen.”34			
There	were	one-hundred	and	fifty	polling	stations,	and	an	estimated	82,000	males	
casted	their	votes	(80%-90%	voter	participation	rate).35		The	SNL	won	twenty	of	the	Legislative	
Council’s	thirty-three	available	seats,	with	the	USP	coming	in	second	place	gaining	twelve	
seats.36		Muhammad	Haji	Ibrahim	Igal,	who	led	the	SNL,	became	the	“Leader	of	Government	
Business”	of	the	Legislative	Council,	in	essence	its	president.37		Somalization	also	followed	with	
all	six	districts	of	the	Protectorate	“in	the	direct	charge	of	Somali	officials.”38	
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Hall, Douglas (1961).  Somaliland’s Last Year as a Protectorate.  African Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 238, pp. 7. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Lewis, I.M.  A Modern History of the Somali.  Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 153-54.  
37 Ibid.  
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To	facilitate	its	newfound	policy	of	granting	the	Protectorate	independence,	the	British	
hosted	a	constitutional	conference	in	London	on	May	2,	1960,	in	which	the	Protectorate’s	
delegation	was	led	by	Igal.39		The	conference	concluded	on	May	12,	and	“ended	with	the	
signing	of	a	report	by	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Colonies,	which	formally	specified	the	date	
of	independence	of	Somaliland	(26	June	1960),	and	its	union	with	Somalia	(1	July	1960).”40	
	
Somalia	Italiana	and	the	United	Nations	Trusteeship	
	 	
	 The	British	colonized	northern	Somalia	while	the	
Italians	colonized	the	southern	part.	Somalia	Italiana,	
Italy’s	colony,	was	first	established	in	1882	“when	the	
Sultan	of	Zanzibar	ceded	the	ports	of	Brava,	Merca,	[and]	
Mogadishu	.	.	..”41		In	1899,	the	Italians	extended	their	
sphere	of	influence	by	signing	treaties	with	the	leaders	
of	the	Majarteen	clan:	Sultan	of	Hobyo	and	Sultan	of	Majarteenia.42		Somalia	Italiana’s	
territorial	confines	would	further	be	expanded	when	the	British	gave	the	Italians	the	far-south	
Somali	city	of	Kismayo.43		
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	 Somalia	Italiana	was	peaceful	and	for	the	most	part	the	local	Somalis	did	not	rebel	like	
the	Dervish	in	the	north.		“A	large	subsidy	came	from	Rome	and	.	.	.	Somalis	got	a	good	deal	of	
work	which	made	them	fairly	well	disposed	towards	the	Italian	administration.	The	desert	folk	
were	not	interfered	with	very	much	and,	as	is	their	custom,	they	kept	as	far	away	from	officials,	
troops,	and	police	as	they	could.	The	Italians	were	very	actively	engaged	on	the	making	of	roads	
and	the	erection	of	buildings.”44		Italy	would	continue	to	govern	Somalia	Italiana	until	Italy’s	
defeat	in	World	War	II.			
After	the	Allies	emerged	victorious	in	World	War	II,	one	of	the	many	issues	they	had	to	
solve	was	what	to	do	with	Italy’s	colonial	possessions.		The	Allies	decided	that	Somalia	Italiana’s	
fate	would	be	decided	by	the	newly	established	United	Nations.45		The	UN	General	Assembly	in	
1949	agreed	that	Somalia	Italiana	would	be	placed	under	a	United	Nations	Trusteeship,	which	
came	under	a	British	protectorate	at	the	time	of	Italy’s	defeat,	administered	by	Italy	in	which	
“Italian	Somalia	has	to	be	recognized	as	an	independent	state	in	ten	years	.	.	.	.”46			
The	Trusteeship	agreement	officially	commenced	on	April	1,	1950	and	sought	to	
gradually	prepare	Somalis	for	self-governance	and	eventual	independence	in	1960.47		In	order	
to	accomplish	this	goal	within	a	decade’s	time	“the	agreement	put	special	emphasis	on	the	
education	system,	which	was	considered	‘the	best	instrument	for	promoting	the	social,	
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economic,	political	and	moral	progress	of	the	population	of	the	territory.’”48		In	addition	to	
giving	the	Italians	administrative	duties,	the	UN	had	its	own	Advisory	Council	based	in	
Mogadishu	to	observe	the	developments	towards	Somali	independence.			
	 Amongst	the	accomplishments	of	the	Trusteeship,	the	most	notable	highlights	were	the	
four	democratic	elections	that	took	place.		In	1954,	the	first	municipal	elections	were	
conducted,	followed	by	the	first	national	legislative	elections	in	1956.49		In	1958	and	1959,	the	
second	municipal	and	national	legislative	elections	occurred,	respectively.50		Prior	to	colonialism	
and	national	independence,	Somali	sociopolitical	structures	were	solely	based	on	paternal	
kinship	ties	(i.e.	clans)	managed	and	organized	around	the	Xeer	(customary	law),	therefore	
making	Somali	society	“quintessentially	stateless.”51		With	the	advent	of	the	Trusteeship,	
Somalis	began	to	organize	themselves	politically	through	parties,	although	these	political	
parties	still	maintained	strong	paternal	kingship	ties.52		In	actuality,	clan	relationships	played	an	
important	part	in	the	Somali	people’s	democratic	experiment	throughout	the	Trusteeship	era.		
“Clan	division	appears	to	be	the	most	evident	and	major	partition	of	Somali	society	.	.	.	The	SYL	
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[Somali	Youth	League],	the	strongest	declared	pan-Somali	movement	in	this	period,	had	
political	supremacy	but	did	not	manage	to	eliminate	clannism	from	political	competition.”53	
	 Somalis	first	tasted	electoral	democracy	with	municipal	elections	in	March	1954,	
although	only	males	were	allowed	to	vote.		Since	Somali	society	was	quintessentially	stateless,	
the	“inexperience	of	the	political	parties	with	modern	electoral	systems	and	the	political	
immaturity	of	the	masses	persuaded	the	United	Nations	and	the	Administering	Authority	to	
extend	gradually	the	suffrage	in	Somalia.”54		Sixteen	political	parties	partook	in	the	1954	
elections,	but	only	two	parties	emerged	as	authentic	political	vanguards.		The	two	parties	were	
the	Somali	Youth	League	(SYL)	and	the	Hizbia	Digil-Mirifleh	(HDM);	of	the	two-hundred	and	
eighty-one	seats	available,	the	SYL	won	one-hundred	and	forty-two	and	the	HDM	won	fifty-
seven.55		The	results	effectively	made	the	SYL	the	“ruling	party”	while	the	HDM	served	as	the	
“opposition	party.”		It	should	be	noted	that	the	HDM’s	political	and	economic	platform	
propagated	that	Somalia	should	be	a	federal	state,	in	effect	making	them	the	first	Somali	
proponents	of	federalism.56		These	elections	were	deemed	successful	and	highly	participatory	
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with	more	than	75%	of	registered	voters	partaking.57		Part	of	its	success	is	owed	to	the	census	
that	was	conducted	prior	to	the	1954	elections,	in	which	thirty-five	towns	and	villages	
participated.58			
	 Following	the	elections,	the	Administering	Authority	presented	a	“series	of	Seven-Year	
Development	Plans	for	the	period	1954-1960	.	.	.”59	and	its	purpose	was	“evaluating	the	
country’s	economic	improvement.”60		Another	post-election	development	was	the	introduction	
of	the	Somali	national	flag,	which	was	“presented	to	the	UN	mission	in	Somalia	in	September	
1954.”61		The	last	major	task	for	the	Administering	Authority	was	to	lay	the	ground	work	for	the	
1956	general	elections	for	the	Legislative	Assembly.	
	 Like	the	1954	elections,	the	first	general	legislative	elections	were	restricted	to	male	
voters	who	were	twenty-one	and	older.62		Sixty	seats	were	available	to	Somalis,	while	ten	seats	
were	designated	for	minority	communities:	Italians,	Arabs,	Indians,	and	Pakistanis.63		Of	the	
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sixty	available	seats,	the	SYL	won	forty-three	while	the	HDM	won	thirteen.64		The	SYL’s	leader,	
Aden	A.	Osman,	became	the	President	of	the	Legislative	Assembly;	65	he	would	later	become	
the	first	president	of	an	independent	Somalia.		That	year	also	marked	the	Somalization	of	the	
Trusteeship	territory,	with	the	Legislative	Assembly	in	majoritarian	hands	of	Somalis	as	well	as	
all	Provincial	and	District	Commissioners.66		A	milestone	had	been	achieved	with	the	advent	of	
elections	for	the	municipalities	and	Legislative	Assembly.		“Throughout	the	trusteeship	years,	
the	United	Nations	called	not	only	for	the	training	of	Somalis	for	governmental	posts	but	also	
for	Somalization,	that	is,	wider	participation	by	Somalis	in	the	governmental	process.”67			
	 The	1958	municipal	elections	were	the	first	truly	democratic	elections	because	Somali	
women	were	finally	allowed	to	vote,	which	resulted	in	85.5%	of	registered	voters	voting.68		
Somali	women	did	not	shy	away	from	the	ballot	box,	“despite	all	predictions	to	the	contrary	
and	despite	the	male	bias	of	traditional	Muslim	society,	[Somali	women]	showed	great	
interest.”69		In	addition	to	woman	suffrage,	the	voting	age	was	lowered	to	eighteen	years,	
which	resulted	in	an	increase	of	the	voter	registrar,	with	156,636	voters	in	the	1958	elections	
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compared	to	the	50,740	in	the	1954	elections.70		The	last	elections	of	the	Trusteeship	took	
place	in	1959	for	the	Legislative	Assembly.71		These	four	elections	prepared	the	Trusteeship	
territory	for	independence,	and	would	set	the	foundation	for	Somalia’s	political	structure.			
	 Electoral	democracy	was	now	firmly	embedded	in	the	Somali	sociopolitical	culture.		
Since	the	Italians	were	the	Administrative	Authority	of	the	Trusteeship,	they	introduced	a	form	
of	governance	which	was	“copied	from	the	Italian	political	model,”	but	in	reality,	it	“could	not	
manage	the	dynamics	of	the	clan	system	effectively.”72		The	foundation	of	Somali	society	is	
based	on	clan	relations,	and	the	Italian	democratic	system,	which	was	imported	to	the	Somalis,	
was	“not	respectful	of	the	Somali	traditional	structure,	Italy	promoted	the	adoption	of	a	form	of	
state	inappropriate	to	the	Somali	people.”73		This	inappropriate	political	structure	of	Somali	
society	would	play	a	detrimental	role	in	the	Somali	Republic,	and	even	today	hinders	the	
emergence	of	a	politically	stable	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	(the	FGS	currently	uses	this	
same	Italian-imported	structure).	Even	the	fall	of	the	Somali	state	can	be	partially	blamed	on	
the	un-Somali	political	foundation	of	the	country.		As	Basil	observed:	“Somali	society	has	torn	
itself	in	pieces,	not	only	because	the	institutions	set	in	place	in	1960	gave	play	to	the	rivalries	of	
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clan-structured	society,	but,	worse,	impelled	these	rivalries	with	new	methods	and	
resources.”74	
	
Colonial	Era	Summation		 	
	
		 The	British	and	Italians	differed	in	their	process	of	colonizing	their	respective	territories	
in	Somalia.		The	Italians	under	the	UN	Trusteeship	prepared	their	territory	for	independence	
starting	in	1950,	while	the	British	did	not	even	consider	notions	of	independence	until	the	very	
end	of	1958.		The	British	rushed	through	their	process	of	self-governance	and	Somalization	
within	four	months,	while	the	Italians	gradually	implemented	their	process	from	1954	until	
eventual	independence	in	1960.				
When	Somalia	Italiana	(southern	Somalia)	and	the	British	Somaliland	Protectorate	
(northern	Somalia)	merged	to	form	the	Somali	Republic,	southern	Somalia	was	better	prepared	
and	thus	more	influential.		The	national	capital	became	Mogadishu,	the	capital	of	Somalia	
Italiana,	and	the	Somali	Republic’s	form	of	governance	was	modeled	after	Italy.		Additionally,	
the	President,	Prime	Minister,	and	Speaker	of	the	House	of	the	newly	independent	Somali	
Republic	all	hailed	from	the	south.		
	
Somali	Republic	(1960-1969)	
	
The	Somali	Republic	is	unique	amongst	its	African	nation-state	peers	because	its	
territorial	confines	were	not	drawn	by	Europeans,	but	rather	by	Somalis	who	united	two	
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colonial	territories	to	create	an	African	nation-state	whose	jurisdiction	was	not	identical	to	the	
original	colonial	lines.		In	April	1960,	the	political	leaders	of	the	Protectorate	and	Trusteeship	
“agreed	to	the	speedy	unification	of	the	two	Somali	territories.”75		The	Protectorate	received	
independence	on	June	26,	1960	while	the	Trusteeship	received	it	on	July	1,	1960.		Somali	
Independence	Day	is	therefore	officially	celebrated	on	June	26th,	while	its	Republic’s	Day	is	
celebrated	on	July	1st.						
Prior	to	independence	of	the	two	Somali	territories,	leaders	from	the	Trusteeship	sent	
the	draft	constitution	for	the	Somali	Republic	to	the	leaders	of	the	Protectorate;	except	for	the	
addition	of	one	article,	leaders	of	the	Protectorate	accepted	the	draft	constitution	in	totality.76		
Upon	independence,	“[t]he	first	act	of	the	unified	Northern	[British	Somaliland	Protectorate]	
and	Southern	[Somalia	Italiana]	parliaments	was	the	approval	of	the	Union	Act	by	
acclamation.”77	
	 Somali	studies	scholar,	I.M.	Lewis,	observed	that	“[t]o	appreciate	the	full	import	of	this	
immediate	consequence	of	union	it	is	necessary	to	realize	that,	despite	the	patriotic	fervor	
which	acclaimed	the	formation	of	the	Republic,	the	most	all-pervasive	element	in	politics	
remained	the	loyalty	of	the	individual	to	his	kin	and	clan.”78		He	would	further	add	that	clan	
“remained	the	most	pervasive,	the	most	commanding,	and	above	all	the	most	insidious.		No	
other	single	line	of	communication	and	common	interest	connected	so	directly	and	
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incontrovertibly	the	pastoral	nomad	in	the	interior	with	his	kinsmen	in	the	civil	service,	in	the	
National	Assembly,	or	in	the	cabinet	itself.		No	other	bond	of	mutual	interest	had	so	many	far-
reaching	ramification	in	all	aspects	of	private	and	public	life.”79			
In	addition	to	clan	ties,	dual-colonial	identity	hampered	the	integration	of	the	two	
halves,	north-south	axis,	of	the	Somali	Republic.		The	northern	half’s	legal,	administrative,	and	
political	system	was	based	on	British	traditions,	while	the	southern	half’s	on	Italian	traditions.		
Also,	political	and	economic	power	became	concentrated	in	the	south,	since	Mogadishu	served	
as	the	capital	of	the	Republic	and	seat	of	the	National	Assembly.		Due	to	southern	domination	
of	the	Republic,	northerners,	especially	those	with	ties	to	the	SNL,	felt	unfairly	cheated	in	the	
dispensation	of	national	power	because	“[t]he	north	scarified	more	than	the	south”	for	the	
sake	of	unity.80		As	we	will	observe	shortly,	this	almost	led	to	the	demise	of	the	nascent	Somali	
Republic.			
After	voting	on	the	Union	Act,	all	123	members	of	the	united	Somali	national	assembly	
(90	seats	for	the	south	and	33	for	the	north)	voted	for	Aden	Abdillah	Osman	to	be	the	
transitional	president	of	the	new	Republic	until	the	1961	constitutional	referendum.81		The	SYL	
leader,	Abdirashid	Ali	Sharmarke,	was	tapped	by	Somalia’s	President	to	become	the	Republic’s	
prime	minister.82		The	transitional	government	had	a	one	year	mandate,	in	which	its	two	major	
                                                
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. at 172 
81 Lewis, I.M. The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 392-93 
82 Samatar, Ahmed I., Samatar, Ahmed I. (2002). Somalis As Africa’s First Democrats. Bildhaan, Vol. 2, pp. 32 
 24 
goals	were	integrating	the	northern	and	southern	halves	of	the	country	and	hosting	a	national	
referendum	on	its	provisional	constitution.83			
The	constitutional	referendum,	which	was	held	on	June	20th,	1961,	was	considered	a	
test	of	confidence	for	the	new	Republic	and	its	transitional	leaders.84	In	the	north,	the	SNL	
boycotted	the	referendum	and	of	the	100,000	recorded	votes	half	voted	against	it.85		As	
observed	“the	major	opposition	turned	out	to	be	from	the	central	part	of	the	Northern	region	
[Hargeisa-Berbera-Burco	triangle].”86		Nonetheless,	the	constitution	garnered	enough	national	
votes	and	the	referendum	was	considered	to	be	“overwhelmingly	free	and	fair.”87	On	July	6th,	
1961,	after	three	ballots,	Somalia’s	national	assembly	voted	for	Aden	Abdillah	Osman	to	
become	the	country’s	president.		In	return,	President	Osman	reappointed	Sharmarke	to	be	the	
country’s	prime	minister.88		The	Prime	Minister’s	governing	coalition	contained	cabinet	
members	from	the	SYL,	SNL,	and	USP89,	but	within	months,	the	new	administration	would	face	
a	national	problem.						
As	aforementioned,	northern	Somalis	with	ties	to	the	SNL	were	not	happy	with	the	
political	and	economic	distribution	of	power	in	the	new	Somali	Republic	and	in	December	1961,	
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rogue	officers	from	the	north	tried	to	stage	a	coup.90		During	the	Protectorate	era,	the	SNL’s	
original	political	platform	was	for	the	north	to	be	its	own	nation-state	under	the	British	
Commonwealth;	it	would	later	change	its	platform	to	resemble	the	USP’s	and	SYL’s	unionist	
stance.91		The	goal	of	the	failed	coup	was	to	make	the	north	secede	from	Somalia	proper.		I.M.	
Lewis	states	that	“the	real	object	of	the	revolt,	no	doubt	strongly	sympathized	with,	if	not	
directly	aided	and	abetted,	by	elements	within	the	SNL,	was	to	break	with	the	south	and	
destroy	the	Republic.”92		Loyal	soldiers	and	police	quickly	arrested	the	ring-leaders	of	the	failed	
coup,	quelled	the	unrest,	and	a	year	later,	the	Sandhurst-trained	officers	were	tried	in	a	court	
of	law.93			
The	next	few	years	of	the	Republic	were	focused	on	harmonizing	the	north-south	
tension	of	Somalia.		The	Somali	government	understood	that	more	attention	needed	to	be	
given	to	the	north	and	the	Administration	implemented	new	development	and	industrial	
projects	for	it.94		In	addition,	the	Administration	focused	its	national	efforts	towards	
“reintegration	and	reform	of	the	civil	service;	finding	a	major	power	to	train	and	arm	the	Somali	
military;	and	development	planning.”95		It	wasn’t	until	the	end	of	1963	that	both	halves	of	the	
Somali	Republic	would	be	legally	and	administratively	integrated.”96					
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The	next	major	goal	for	the	administration	was	to	host	the	general	elections	of	1964,	
but	the	Republic	would	face	a	national	crisis	prior	to	it.		Tensions	between	Ethiopia	and	Somalia	
had	been	brewing	since	prior	to	independence	because	of	a	border	dispute,	and	in	early	1964	
all-out	war	erupted	between	the	two	nations	when	Ethiopia	unilaterally	attacked	Somali	
territory.97	Somalia	held	its	general	elections	for	its	national	assembly	on	March	30th,	1964.98		
Prime	Minister	Abdirashid	famously	addressed	the	nation	by	stating	that,	“We	will	vote	with	
one	hand	and	fight	with	the	other.”99		The	first	Somali-Ethiopian	war	ended	with	mediation	
from	Sudan.100			
The	1964	elections	witnessed	the	demise	of	the	SNL	and	USP,	and	the	entrance	of	two	
new	political	alliances,	the	Somali	National	Congress	(SNC)	and	the	Somali	Democratic	Union	
(SDU).101		By	now,	northern	disgruntlement	had	been	assuaged,	and	these	new	political	
alliances	“signified	the	collapse	of	the	northern-southern	regional	axis,	and	indicated	the	
common	commitment	of	all	the	political	leaders	to	the	Republic	as	a	unitary	state.”102		The	SYL	
triumphantly	won	that	election	by	gaining	sixty-nine	of	the	123	seats,	the	SNC	and	SDU	would	
garner	twenty-two	and	fifteen	seats,	respectively,	while	the	HDMS	garnered	nine	seats	(the	
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remaining	eight	seats	went	to	others).103		As	noted,	“the	manner	in	which	the	elections	were	
conducted,	and	the	extent	to	which	opposition	parties	participated	in	them,	reaffirmed	the	
Republic’s	continuing	commitment	to	the	principles	of	parliamentary	democracy.”104	
President	Osman	was	reelected	and	he	appointed	Abdirazak	H.	Hussein	as	his	prime	
minister.105		Premier	Hussein	was	known	as	a	reformist	and	a	“politician	of	considerable	
personal	charisma	and	courage.”106		His	main	objectives	were	“public	service	reform;	
corruption;	and	preparation	for	the	next	presidential	election.”107		His	tenure	as	premier	is	
known	for	curbing	corruption,	which	had	become	a	major	problem	in	the	nascent	Somali	
Republic.	
One	element	of	the	Premier’s	reform	agenda	was	the	establishment	of	the	Public	
Service	Commission,	which	was	“given	the	task	of	reviewing	all	promotions	and	demotions	of	
civil	servants.”108			This	would	eventually	lead	to	three	ministers	as	well	as	other	civil	servants	
being	dismissed;	the	reform	agenda	targeted	three	types	of	employees,	“the	corrupt,	the	
incompetent,	and	individuals	engaged	in	leaking	national	security	information.”109			Another	
bold	reform	agenda	of	Premier	Hussein	was	having	all	his	cabinet	members	declare	and	register	
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their	assets.110		These	reforms	would	later	haunt,	both,	the	President	and	his	Prime	Minister,	
when	the	1967	general	elections	came	around.		Members	of	Parliament	were	not	fond	of	
Premier	Hussein’s	new	style	of	good	governance.111			
Even	though	incumbent	President	Osman	had	the	official	endorsement	of	his	SYL	
party112,	former	Premier	Sharmarke,	who	also	a	member	of	the	SYL,	was	able	to	mobilize	the	
national	assembly	to	vote	him	in	as	the	new	president	of	the	Somali	Republic.113		The	president-
elect	would	in	turn	nominate	Haji	Ibrahim	Egal	as	his	prime	minister;	this	was	the	first	time	in	
the	Republic’s	history	that	a	northerner	was	given	the	premiership.114		
Somali-American	scholars	Ahmed	and	Abdi	Samatar	have	stated	that	the	Osman-
Hussein	government	should	be	held	in	high	regard,	in	terms	of	governance,	due	to	their	
“combined	contributions	as	exemplary	of	what	courageous	and	noble	spirit	mean.		Their	
clairvoyance	to	discern	what	was	imperative	for	a	different	and	more	enabling	future,	coupled	
with	a	resolute	belief	in	the	necessity	of	constitutional	practice	to	the	making	of	a	mature	
political	community,	are	inspiring	for	Somali	and	African	time,	desperate	for	both.”115		More	
importantly,	President	Osman	and	Premier	Hussein’s	acceptance	of	defeat,	and	handing	over	
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the	keys	of	the	state	to	their	electoral	opponents,	made	them	“Africa’s	first	genuine	modern	
democrats	.	.	.	.”116	
The	1967	elections	would	serve	as	a	major	turning	point	for	the	Somali	Republic,	and	its	
demise	would	soon	follow	after	two	years.		With	the	reformists	gone	and	Sharmarke	and	Egal	
back	in	power,	clan	ties	became	more	apparent.		These	problems	peaked	during	the	
subsequent	1969	elections,	a	total	of	1002	candidates,	representing	sixty-two	political	parties,	
the	majority	being	clan-based	parties,	contested	these	elections.117		As	usual,	the	SYL	won	the	
overwhelming	majority	of	the	seats	(seventy-three),	and	once	again	President	Sharmarke	and	
Premier	Egal	became	head	of	the	state	and	government,	respectively.		The	Somali	populace	
believed	the	government	rigged	the	elections	or	that	many	irregularities	took	place.118		As	
observed,	“official	corruption	and	nepotism	[i.e.	clannism]	seemed	to	be	flourishing	on	a	scale	
hitherto	unknown	in	the	Republic	.	.	.	The	National	Assembly	was	no	longer	the	symbol	of	free	
speech	and	fair	play	for	all	citizens.		On	the	contrary,	it	had	been	turned	into	a	sordid	market-
place	where	deputies	traded	their	votes	for	personal	rewards	with	scant	regard	for	the	interest	
of	their	constituents.”119		Between	January	1969	and	October	1969,	£500,000	(758,	000	USD)	
were	given	to	various	members	of	the	National	Assembly.120	
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Under	these	scathing	conditions,	a	national	tragedy	transpired	that	derailed	Somalia’s	
democratic	experiment.		On	October	15,	1969,	President	Sharmarke	was	assassinated	by	one	of	
his	guards,	and	on	the	morning	of	October	21,	the	Somali	military	executed	a	coup	d’état.121		
“The	National	Assembly	was	closed,	political	parties	were	declared	illegal,	and	it	was	
announced	that	the	state	would	be	governed	by	a	Supreme	Revolutionary	Council.”122				
	
	
	
Somali	Democratic	Republic	(1969-1991)	
	
	 The	Commander	of	the	Army,	General	Mohamed	Siad	Bare,	became	the	President	of	the	
country,	and	following	communist	lexicon,	renamed	it	the	Somali	Democratic	Republic.123		
Scientific	Socialism	became	the	new	ideology	of	the	Somali	state,	and	through	it	the	vestiges	of	
clannism	and	corruption	were,	purportedly,	buried.124		Like	other	communist	countries,	
President	Bare	developed	a	pervasive	security	apparatus	known	as	the	National	Security	
Service,	and	its	function	was	to	be	the	“long	and	strong	arm	of	the	state,	with	unlimited	power	
to	search,	detain,	and	even	torture	and	kill	suspected	dissidents.”125	
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	 Somalis	initially	welcomed	the	military	takeover	of	the	state	due	to	the	corrupt	and	
nepotistic	nature	of	its	democratic	experiment.		“In	the	view	of	the	most	disillusioned	critics,	
democracy	had	lapsed	into	commercialized	anarchy,	and	strong	rule	of	a	new	type	was	
desperately	needed	if	the	state	was	to	be	rescued	from	its	present	morass	of	poverty,	
insecurity,	and	inefficiency,	and	set	on	the	road	to	progress.”126	
	 President	Bare	focused	on	developing	Somalia’s	infrastructure,	economy,	and	its	human	
capacity.		His	greatest	feat	of	developing	Somalia’s	human	capacity	is	arguably	developing	
orthography	for	the	Somali	language;	prior	to	1972,	the	language	was	purely	oral.		He	chose	the	
Roman	script	for	the	Somali	language,	and	would	launch	“intensive	nation-wide	urban	and	rural	
literacy	campaigns	in	1973	and	1974.”127			
	 Since	two-thirds	of	Somalia’s	economy	was	based	on	“the	rural	sector	(pastoral,	
agriculture,	and	fisheries),”	another	development	objective	of	his	was	“the	control	of	animal	
disease;	the	extension	of	agricultural	crash	programs;	and	an	improvement	of	food	grain	
production	and	marketing	.	.	..”128		His	development	of	the	industrial	sub-sector	was	somewhat	
fruitful,	“public	establishments	grew	from	fourteen	in	1970	to	forty-six	in	1974.”129					
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	 Even	though	President	Bare	espoused	the	ideology	of	socialism,	he	still	relied	on	
Somalia’s	traditional	sociopolitical	structure,	clan	ties,	to	rule.		His	inner	power	circle	was	
dubbed	the	“MOD	clique,”	in	which	the	M	represented	his	clan,	the	O	represented	his	mother’s	
clan	(i.e.	his	maternal	clan	ties),	and	the	D	represented	the	clan	of	his	son-in-law,	who	
controlled	security	affairs.130		Until	Somalia’s	defeat	in	the	1978	Ogaden	War,	President	Bare	
was	able	to	govern	and	rule	Somalia	through	the	delicate	balance	of	a	“two-dimensional	
political	structure,	with	clandestine	clan	politics	at	the	core	and	surface	socialist	nationalism	for	
everyone	else.	.	.	.”131			
	 Somalia	and	Ethiopia	fought	an	intensive	war	from	1977-78	over	the	Somali	inhabited	
region	in	eastern	Ethiopia:	The	Ogaden	(also	referred	to	as	Western	Somalia).		Ethiopia	had	
gained	possession	of	this	Somali	territory	via	a	treaty	with	Britain	in	1954.132		Overtime,	a	
Somali	liberation	movement	with	intentions	of	freeing	its	territory	from	Ethiopian	rule	
emerged,	the	Western	Somali	Liberation	Front	(WSLF).		“Following	successful	risings	against	
Ethiopian	rule	in	neighbouring	provinces	by	allies	of	the	Somalis,	the	forces	of	the	Western	
Somali	Liberation	Front	(WSLF),	aided	by	troops	from	Somalia,	began	in	the	summer	of	1977	to	
push	the	Ethiopians	out	of	the	Ogaden.		The	Somali	victory	was,	however,	short-lived.		The	
conflict	triggered	a	seismic	shift	in	super	power	alignments	in	the	Horn	of	Africa	with	the	
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Russians	turning	to	support	the	Ethiopians	and	enabling	them	to	regain	control	of	the	
Ogaden.”133						
Bare’s	military	junta	suffered	major	losses	after	this	war	which	resulted	in	“widespread	
public	demoralization	and	to	an	upsurge	of	‘tribalism,’”	and	lead	to	disgruntled	military	officers	
attempting	a	failed	coup	in	April	1978.134		Those	who	were	able	to	escape	would	later	form	the	
Somali	Salvation	Democratic	Front	(SSDF),	Somalia’s	first	armed-opposition	group	with	
intentions	of	overthrowing	President	Bare.135		Years	later,	additional	armed-opposition	groups	
would	be	formed	to	help	oust	President	Bare,	most	notably	the	Somali	National	Movement	
(SNM)	and	United	Somali	Congress	(USC).136		These	factions	did	not	differ	in	politics	per	se,	but	
were	just	armed	guerilla	rebels	of	their	respective	clans.	
These	armed	factions,	amongst	others,	justified	their	rebellion	against	Bare’s	regime	
due	to	his	“mismanaging	the	Ogaden	war;	sending	members	of	tribes	other	than	his	own	to	die	
in	the	Ogaden	war;	nepotism;	tribalism;	‘fascist	rule’;	running	‘an	absolute	and	despotic	
dictatorship’;	[and]	the	‘undermining	of	the	faith	and	Islamic	way	of	life	of	the	Somali	people	.	.	
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.	.”137		These	armed	factions	would	eventually	succeed,	and	President	Bare	vacated	Villa	
Somalia	(the	Presidential	Palace)	in	January	1991.		His	final	overthrow	“was	achieved	through	
the	clan-based	militias	and	guerilla	organizations.”138		Subsequently,	the	Somali	state	collapsed	
and	its	failed	state	status	would	remain	intake	for	the	next	two	decades.	
Siad	Bare’s	dictatorship	was	seen	by	many	in	Somalia	as	treating	the	Darood	clan	as	
first-class	citizens,	while	treating	the	rest	as	second.		This	helped	sow	the	seed	of	
discontentment	amongst	Somalis.		“The	only	substantial	difference,	now,	was	that	the	volatile	
relations	between	these	clan	units	across	the	whole	country	had	been	raised	to	a	fever	pitch	by	
the	experience	of	Darod	(particularly	Marehan)	hegemony	and	oppression,	and	the	bitter	
fighting	which,	with	modern	weapons,	wrought	death	and	destruction	on	an	unprecedented	
scale.”139		
	
Somalia	as	a	Failed	State		
	
	 After	the	fall	of	the	Somali	Democratic	Republic	in	1991,	the	Somali	state	broke	down	
into	a	triadic	structure	(see	map140).		The	SNM	took	control	of	northern	Somalia,	the	SSDF	took	
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control	of	eastern	Somalia,	and	the	USC	took	control	of	southcentral	Somalia.141		The	SNM	
unilaterally	declared	independence	from	Somalia	in	May	18	1991,	claiming	jurisdiction	of	the	
former	British	Somaliland	Protectorate.142		The	SNM	named	their	secessionist	entity	the	
Republic	of	Somaliland,	but	it	is	unrecognized	by	the	world	community.143		The	SSDF	pursued	a	
path	of	autonomy,	calling	their	territory	Puntland	on	May	5	1998,	and	saying	it	desires	“to	be	
the	cornerstone	of	a	future	federal	Somalia.”144		Southcentral	Somalia,	and	most	importantly	
Mogadishu,	became	a	violent	and	lawless	area	due	to	warlordism.145		Mogadishu,	once	known	
as	the	“Pearl	of	the	Indian	Ocean,”	during	the	1990s	became	a	“chaotic	graveyard.”146		
Somaliland	
	
Northern	Somalia	is	currently	administered	by	an	armed	
secessionist	movement,	“Somaliland”,	wanting	to	secede	from	
Somalia,	but	it	should	be	highlighted	that	sizable	populations	in	the	
north	adhere	to	the	belief	in	a	united	Somalia.		It	is	not	farfetched	
to	say	that	Somaliland,	and	its	secessionist	ideology,	is	an	existential	
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threat	to	Somalia.		What	the	Republic	of	Biafra	was	to	Nigeria	is	what	the	Republic	of	
Somaliland	is	to	Somalia.			
The	secessionist	Republic	of	Somaliland	is	the	brain	child	of	the	rebel	group	Somali	
National	Movement	(SNM),	which	politically	represented	the	Isaaq	clan.147		After	Siad	Bare’s	fall	
in	January	1991,	the	SNM’s	first	provocative	move	was	to	attack	and	disarm	the	Gadabuursi	
clan	that	reside	in	the	Awdal	province.		The	SNM	conducted	a	“full-scale	assault	on	Borama	
[largest	city	in	Awdal]	on	February	5,	and	armed	operations	in	Zeila	[coastal	city	in	Awdal]	later	
in	the	month.”148		The	people	of	Awdal	have	been	under	secessionist	occupation	since	that	
attack	in	1991.		Later	in	2007,	Somaliland’s	military	attacked	the	eastern	territories	
incorporating	Las	Anod	into	its	secessionist	entity.		 	
Many	experts	view	Somaliland	through	a	narrow	lens,	often	citing	that	it	is	democratic,	
“The	Republic	of	Somaliland,	the	secessionist	northwestern	slice	of	Somalia	that	declared	
independence	in	1991,	has	a	far	better	democratic	track	record	than	any	of	its	neighbors	.	.	
..”149		Though	Somaliland’s	progress	is	commendable,	its	political	motives	are	more	sinister.		
	 Historically,	the	Isaaq	have	a	sociopolitical	ideology	of	clan	supremacy.		Though	
belonging	to	the	Somali	clan	confederation	of	Dir,	the	Isaaq	have	dismissed	this.		“The	Ishaaq	
[Isaaq]	are	classified	by	other	Somali	as	Dir,	but	themselves	deny	this	grouping,	claiming	that	
they	are	a	clan-family	of	Arabian	descent	in	their	own	right	and	without	the	intermediacy	of	
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other	Somali	ancestors.”150		During	British	colonialism,	“the	Isaq	[Isaaq]	refused	to	be	called	
Africans,	or	even	Somali	.	.	.,”151	and	when	British	authorities	tried	to	administer	a	poll-tax	on	
them	as	Somalis	“the	Isaq	[Isaaq]	rejected	their	passes	because	they	were	described	as	Somalis,	
whereas	they	now	called	themselves	Sharif	Isaq	Arabs.”152		When	the	Somaliland	National	
League	(SNL)	was	first	created,	its	political	platform	did	not	initially	advocate	for	unity	with	
other	Somalis,	but	rather	for	the	Protectorate	to	be	its	own	nation.153		When	the	Somali	
Republic	held	its	constitutional	referendum	in	1961,	it	was	the	SNL	that	boycotted	it,	and	it	was	
their	respective	cities	(Hargeisa,	Berbera,	and	Burco)	that	voted	against	it.154		To	add	insult	to	
injury,	it	was	SNL	supporters	who	planned	the	failed	coup	of	1961.		Again,	“the	real	object	of	
the	revolt,	no	doubt	strongly	sympathized	with,	if	not	directly	aided	and	abetted,	by	elements	
within	the	SNL,	was	to	break	with	the	south	and	destroy	the	Republic.”		Lastly,	in	May	1991,	the	
Somali	National	Movement	unilaterally	declared	secession	from	Somalia,	completing	the	task	
their	SNL	forefathers	could	not	in	1961.		Their	historical	overlying	sociopolitical	theme	cannot	
be	denied,	Somaliland’s	raison	d’etre	for	secession	is	based	on	clan	supremacy.						
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	 Not	everyone	in	northern	Somalia	
shares	this	view,	however.		The	clans	that	were	
represented	by	the	colonial	era	United	Somali	
Party	(USP)	still	desire	to	be	part	of	Somalia	
proper,	and	have	started	minor	rebellions	in	the	
north	(see	map:	lighter	area	represents	
unionists).155				
	
Puntland	State	of	Somalia	
	
	 The	Puntland	State	of	Somalia,	located	in	the	north-eastern	part	of	former	Somalia	
Italiana,	is	the	brainchild	of	the	Somali	Salvation	Democratic	Front	(SSDF).156		Puntland	is	a	
union	of	clans	under	the	Darood,157	most	notably	the	Majeerteen	sub-clan.158		The	SSDF	were	
Somali	unionists	and	“there	was	never	apparently	any	suggestion	of	decisively	breaking	from	
Somalia,	as	Somaliland	had	done.”159			
	 The	SSDF	encountered	some	hurdles	between	1991-98	before	officially	creating	
Puntland.		Bare’s	fall	resulted	in	a	political	vacuum	and	gave	way	to	numerous	security	
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threats.160		The	most	notable	threat	came	from	the	United	Somali	Congress	(USC)	based	in	
southcentral	Somalia,	“the	S.S.D.F.	found	itself	defending	its	traditional	grazing	rights	in	Mudug	
region	against	the	determined	efforts	of	‘Aideed’s	Habar	Gidir	Sa’ad	militia,	who	were	bidding	
fair	to	become	a	general	scourge	of	the	whole	country.”161		This	particular	conflict	ended	in	
1993	when	Colonel	Abdulahi	Yusuf,	commander	of	the	SSDF,	and	General	Aideed	of	the	USC,	
signed	the	Mudug	Peace	Agreement.162	
	 By	1998,	the	SSDF,	along	with	their	respective	clan	elders,	“established	the	new	
‘Puntland	state	of	Somalia’	as	an	autonomous	local	entity,	with	[Abdulahi	Yusuf]	as	its	first	
elected	President	.	.	..”163		Since	1998,	Puntland	has	successfully	conducted	five	presidential	
elections,	in	which	their	parliamentarians	are	elected	via	a	clan	formula	similar	to	how	
Somalia’s	House	of	the	People	was	elected	in	2012	and	2016.		Puntland’s	parliamentarians	elect	
their	president.		
	
Southcentral	Somalia					
	
Southcentral	Somalia’s	clan	makeup	is	highly	diverse	so	it	had	more	rebel	groups	than	
Somaliland	and	Puntland,	“[a]s	opposed	to	Somaliland	and	Puntland,	where	violence	was	
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concentrated	more	or	less	in	the	SNM	and	SSDF	respectively,	in	[southcentral]	Somalia	it	was	
diffuse.		In	effect,	the	market-place	for	violence	was	much	more	competitive,	with	no	group	
achieving	anything	close	to	a	monopoly	position.”164			
Though	no	group	achieved	a	monopoly	position,	the	United	Somali	Congress	(USC)	was	
the	most	dominant	player;	the	USC	“concentrated	on	providing	security	and	pursuing	the	
interests	of	the	Hawiye	kin	group.”165		The	United	Somali	Congress	(USC)	did	not	focus	on	
building	a	regional	administration	like	the	SNM	and	SSDF	did,	but	rather,	unsuccessfully,	sought	
to	be	the	Somali	national	government,	“the	USC	failed	to	produce	a	blueprint	for	how	Somalia	
would	be	governed	.	.	.	The	lack	of	political	program	for	the	sharing	of	power	between	groups	
produced	an	even	greater	security	challenge	than	Barre’s	totalitarian	government	by	paving	the	
way	for	warlordism.”166			
Conflict	was	further	exacerbated	when	a	high-ranking	member	of	the	USC,	businessman	
Ali	Mahdi,	declared	himself	the	President	of	Somalia	prior	to	General	Aideed’s	arrival	to	
Mogadishu.167		Aideed	did	not	accept	this	and	war	broke	out	between	their	two	factions.168						
	 The	USC’s	lack	of	visionary	political	leadership	for	a	national	government,	combined	
with	its	internal	factional	war,	resulted	in	southcentral	Somalia’s	complete	disintegration.169		In	
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the	1990s,	warlordism	terrorized	the	inhabitants	of	southcentral	Somalia,	‘Mogadishu	was	thus	
the	centre	of	waves	of	destruction	and	terror	which	radiated	outside	the	city	unpredictably.”170		
	
	
Reestablishing	the	Somali	State	(1991-2012)	
	
Since	its	fall	in	1991,	there	has	been	“fifteen	attempt[s]	by	the	international	community	
at	re-establishing	the	Somali	state.”171		Of	these	fifteen	attempts,	two	stand	out:	(1)	The	Arta	
peace	process	and	(2)	the	Nairobi	peace	process.172		The	Arta	peace	process,	known	as	the	
Somali	National	Peace	Conference,	concluded	in	August	2000	with	the	establishment	of	a	
Transitional	National	Government	(TNG);	both	Somaliland	and	Puntland	boycotted	the	
process.173		Throughout	its	existence,	the	TNG	was	unable	to	gain	control	over	Somalia,	it	did	
not	even	control	Mogadishu.		The	TNG	eventually	failed,	and	in	its	place	emerged	a	Transitional	
Federal	Government	(TFG).		
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The	TFG	was	established	in	August/October	2004	after	the	outcome	of	the	Nairobi	
peace	process.174		The	two	most	significant	political	outcomes	of	this	conference	were	the	
acknowledgment	that	Somalia	would	be	a	federal	state,	and	the	establishment	of	the	‘4.5	
formula,’	in	which	“power	was	to	be	shared	between	the	four	main	clan-families	of	Somalia	.	.	.	
together	with	the	minority	clan-families,	which	constitute	the	0.5.”175		Puntland	participated	in	
this	conference,	but	Somaliland	did	not.			
The	Somali	state	experienced	twelve	years	of	various	transitional	governments,	2000-
2012;	the	transitional	phase	ended	“with	the	announcement	of	a	post-transitional	federal	
government	in	2012	[Federal	Government	of	Somalia]	.	.	.	.”176	
In	August	2012,	based	on	the	4.5	formula,	clan	elders	appointed	members	for	Somalia’s	
post-transitional	parliament,	and	subsequently	that	parliament	elected	Hassan	Sheikh	
Mohamed	as	Somalia’s	first	post-transitional	president.177		President	Mohamed’s	victory	was	
widely	accepted	by	Somalis	due	to	the	fact	that	he	was	“viewed	as	part	of	a	‘constructive	elite’	
that	had	stayed	in	Mogadishu	throughout	the	20-year	crisis	and	built	schools,	universities,	
hospitals,	and	business.”178		The	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	(FGS)	is	the	first	government	
to	gain	official	diplomatic	recognition	from	the	community	of	nations	since	the	fall	of	the	
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Somali	state	in	1991.		Currently,	the	FGS’s	“capacity	is	weak,	budgets	modest,	corruption	high,	
and	institutionalization	low.”179				
As	of	the	writing	of	this	paper,	the	mandate	for	the	FGS’s	first	administration	is	over;	
Somalia	successfully	elected	new	members	of	parliament	in	December	2016.		These	elections	
differed	slightly	from	the	2012	elections.		In	2012,	135	clan	elders	selected	all	members	of	
parliament	(House	of	the	People);	in	2016,	the	same	135	clan	elders	selected	an	approximate	
14,000	electoral	college	members,	who	in	turn	elected	Somalia’s	new	members	of	parliament	
(House	of	the	People).		Somalia’s	parliamentarians	elected	the	new	President	of	Somalia	on	
February	8,	2017.		The	Federal	Government	of	Somalia’s	second	administration	has	a	four-year	
mandate	ending	in	2021.			
	
Insights	and	Lessons	
	
I	have	spent	a	good	portion	of	my	analysis	of	Somalia’s	sociopolitical	history	on	two	
eras:	the	UN	Trusteeship,	1950-60,	and	the	Somali	Republic,	1960-69.		I	find	that	these	two	eras	
are	the	most	analogous	to	Somalia’s	current	political	situation,	and	therefore	offer	us	the	best	
insights	and	lessons.		Today,	Somalia	finds	itself	trying	to	regain	statehood	with	international	
guidance	from	the	United	Nations	Assistance	Mission	to	Somalia	(UNSOM).		This	resembles	the	
1950-60	era,	when	Somalia	was	preparing	herself	to	gain	statehood	for	the	first	time	with	
international	guidance	via	the	United	Nations	Trusteeship.		The	political	platform	for	Somalia’s	
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third	republic	is	a	multiparty	parliamentary	democracy,	just	as	it	was	during	the	Somali	Republic	
era,	1960-69,	albeit	it	will	be	a	federal	state	and	not	a	unitary	state.		
The	Trusteeship	era	gives	us	invaluable	guidance	on	how	the	international	community	
prepared	Somalis	for	statehood.		We	learn	that	the	major	focal	point	for	preparing	Somalis	for	
self-governance	was	placed	on	education.		Institutions	of	higher	learning	were	established,	and	
enrollments	of	primary	and	secondary	education	were	expanded.180		The	United	Nations	
enhanced	Somalia’s	educational	system	to	develop	its	human	capacity	for	good	governance.		
Today,	Somalia’s	educational	system	is	in	shambles	due	to	two-decades	plus	of	civil	strife,	and	
Somalia’s	youth	have	suffered	the	most.		The	United	Nations	Development	Programme	
estimates	that	seventy	percent	of	Somalia’s	population	is	under	the	age	of	thirty,	which	means	
the	overwhelming	majority	of	Somalia’s	population	suffered	from	the	lack	of	traditional	
education	systems.181		Strangely,	the	FGS	and	UNSOM	sought	to	introduce	nationwide	elections	
by	the	end	of	2016	without	properly	preparing	the	Somali	populace	via	an	educational	system.		
The	lesson	here	is	that	much	emphasis	should	be	placed	on	establishing	an	educational	system	
which	promotes	primary	and	secondary	schools	across	Somalia,	with	special	emphasis	on	adult-
based	schooling	for	those	who	came	of	age	during	the	stateless	era.		
Another	valuable	lesson	from	the	Trusteeship	era	is	the	gradual	democratization	of	
Somalia.		The	Trusteeship	introduced	democracy	to	Somalia	in	moderation,	with	municipal	
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elections	taking	place	two	years	prior	to	national	elections.		The	FGS	and	UNSOM	planned	to	
have	a	national	election	by	the	end	of	2016,	yet	no	Federal	Member	State	(or	Interim	
Administration)	has	ever	had	one-person	one-vote	elections	within	their	respective	territories.		
The	wiser	approach	would	be	to	have	one-person	one-vote	regional	elections	in	all	the	
respective	Federal	Member	States	first	to	gradually	establish	democracy	in	Somalia	prior	to	
having	a	national	election.							
We	learned	during	the	Somali	Republic’s	era	that	transposing	an	Italian-state	model	
ignores	the	unique	nature	of	Somalia’s	traditional	sociopolitical	foundation,	the	clan	structure.		
To	borrow	from	the	Chinese,	what	is	needed	in	Somalia	is	“democracy	with	Somali	
characteristics.”		Washington,	D.C.’s	democracy	and	London’s	democracy	differ	in	composition,	
yet	both	are	authentically	democratic.		Therefore	it	is	only	natural	that	Mogadishu’s	democracy	
will	differ	as	well.		Somalis	can	no	longer	ignore	the	clan	structure	in	their	political	calculus,	
something	they	acknowledged	in	the	Nairobi	peace	process.		What	is	now	needed	is	the	
permanent	institutionalization	of	the	clan	structure	in	the	national	political	fabric	of	the	new	
Somalia.		If	Somalia	is	to	fully	regain	statehood,	her	modern	democratic	foundation	must	
complement	her	traditional	clan	structure.	
An	additional	lesson	we	learned	from	the	era	of	the	Somali	Republic	is	that	the	lack	of	
good	governance	hampers	the	political	development	of	the	Somali	state,	and	eventually	leads	
to	unwanted	outcomes.		Corruption	and	nepotism	weakened	the	fabric	of	the	Somali	Republic,	
and	if	not	checked,	will	also	weaken	the	new	emerging	Somali	state.		Somalia’s	former	
president,	Hassan	Sheikh	Mohamud,	acknowledged	the	need	for	good	governance	in	his	
foreword	in	Foreign	Policy	of	Somalia.		He	states:	
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been	one	of	the	major	causes	of	the	collapse	of	Somalia’s	socioeconomic	development.”182		
What	is	needed	is	a	technocratic	civil	service	and	national/regional	administrations	free	of	
corrupt	vices.		Enhancing	Somalia’s	educational	system	will	help	in	this	endeavor.	
When	one	properly	analyzes	Somalia’s	modern	sociopolitical	history	and	the	goals	
enshrined	in	Vision	2016,	one	reaches	a	practical	conclusion	that	the	three	major	goals	
(federation	of	Somalia,	constitutional	revision	and	national	referendum,	and	one-person	one-
vote	national	election)	were	not	genuinely	attainable	in	such	a	short	time.		The	Somali	state	
collapsed	in	1991,	becoming	the	world’s	quintessential	failed	state,	and	has	suffered	from	over	
two	decades	of	civil	strife,	which	include	civil	war,	warlordism/lawlessness,	piracy,	and	violent	
extremism.		Though	noble,	the	timetable	of	Vision	2016	was	not	fair	to	the	Somali	nation	and	
people.		Under	the	theme	“Transitioning	Towards	Democracy,”	Vision	2016	was	formulated	in	
Mogadishu	in	September	2013	with	the	endorsement	of	the	United	Nations.183			In	retrospect,	
we	can	admit	that	it	was	naïve	to	believe	that	the	recovering	Somali	state	was	capable	of	
completing	those	goals	in	three	years.		What	is	now	needed	is	a	reassessment	of	how	to	
complete	the	three	major	goals	outlined	in	Vision	2016	by	the	year	2021.	
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The	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	and	the	international	community	need	to	rethink	
the	Somali	state,	or	more	precisely,	rethink	how	Somalia	will	achieve	full	statehood.		In	the	
section	below,	I	provide	timetables	to	achieve	the	three	major	goals	and	provide	policy	
solutions	on	how	to	reach	them	by	2021.		Specifically,	I	am	advocating	for	a	more	detailed	
approach	to	achieving	the	three	outlined	goals	by	providing	a	different	formula,	a	bottom-up	
approach.		This	more	detailed	version,	Vision	2021,	lays	out	more	realistic	and	logical	
parameters	for	Somalia	to	re-attain	statehood.				
	
Rethinking	the	Somali	State:	Vision	2021	
	
In	order	to	achieve	the	goals	of	constitutional	revision,	followed	by	a	national	
referendum,	and	one-person	one-vote	national	elections,	Somalia’s	federalization	process	must	
first	be	completely	finalized	and	institutionalized.		The	full	federalization	of	Somalia’s	regions	
has	not	authentically	transpired	yet,	and	official	demarcation	of	Somalia’s	regional	states	has	
not	been	completed.			
The	south,	what	use	to	be	Somalia	Italiana,	is	in	the	
final	process	on	federalizing	into	six	potential	states	(see	
map184).		Somalia’s	Provisional	Constitution	stipulates	that	
“Based	on	a	voluntary	decision,	two	or	more	regions	may	
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merge	to	form	a	Federal	Member	State.”185		The	regions	are	based	on	the	Somali	Democratic	
Republic’s	provincial	administrative	boundaries	at	its	fall	in	1991.		There	were/are	eighteen	
regions	in	Somalia	proper,	with	five	provinces	situated	in	the	north	and	thirteen	in	the	south.							
As	of	today,	Puntland	State	is	the	only	official	Federal	Member	State,	but	the	FGS	and	
UNSOM	have	helped	create	four	Interim	Administrations	that	will	presumably	become	official	
Federal	Member	States.		These	four	are:	Interim	Jubaland	Administration	(Jubaland	State),	
Interim	Southwest	Administration	(Southwest	State),	Interim	Galmudug	Administration	
(Galmudug	State),	Interim	Hirshabelle	Administration	(Hirshabelle	State).		The	last	remaining	
region/province	in	the	south	is	Banaadir.		What	shall	happen	to	Banaadir	is	still	up	in	the	air.		
Jubaland	and	Southwest	states	encompass	three	regions,	and	Hirshabelle	State	
encompasses	two.		Some	are	proposing	that	Banaadir	become	a	Federal	Member	State,	which	
runs	counter	to	the	“two	regions	or	more”	requirement	stipulated	in	the	Provisional	
Constitution.		It	should	be	noted	that	Mogadishu	is,	literally,	the	only	city	in	the	Banaadir	
region.		Puntland	encompasses	two	whole	regions,	and	specific	districts	of	three	other	regions.					
Galmudug	State,	in	theory,	is	an	amalgamation	of	two	regions,	Galguduud	and	Mudug,	
but	Puntland	claims	jurisdiction	over	northern	Mudug	province,	specifically	its	districts	of	
Galdogob,	Galkayo,	and	Jariban	(see:	Constitution	of	the	Regional	Puntland	State	of	Somalia,	
Article	6.	Section	1.).		This	leaves	the	remaining	two	districts	of	Mudug	province,	Harardhere	
and	Hobyo,	within	the	jurisdictional	confines	of	Mudug	State.		Therefore,	Galmudug	State	will	
not	be	an	amalgamation	of	two	provinces,	but	rather	one	and	one-half	of	a	province,	which	also	
                                                
185 Provisional Fed. Const. June 12, 2012, art. 49, §6 (Som.). 
 49 
runs	counter	to	the	“two	regions	or	more”	requirement	stipulated	in	the	Provisional	
Constitution.		In	addition,	Puntland	claims	jurisdiction	over	certain	districts	of	eastern	Sool	and	
Sanaag	regions,	which	are	also	claimed	by	Somaliland.				
So	there	are	three	major	obstacles	confronting	the	territorial	aspects	of	the	
federalization	process	of	southern	Somalia.		These	are:	(1)	Puntland’s	and	Galmudug’s	
overlapping	claim	to	Mudug	province,	(2)	Puntland’s	and	Somaliland’s	overlapping	claim	to	Sool	
and	Sanaag,	and	(3)	Banaadir	and	Galmudug	States’	disqualification	to	be	Federal	Member	
States	under	the	Constitution,	since	they	only	encompass	one	region,	and	one	and	one-half	
regions,	respectively.		The	FGS	and	UNSOM	must	quickly	solve	these	three	obstacles.			
In	order	to	complete	the	federalization	process	the	“Boundaries	and	Federal	
Commission”	should	be	fully	institutionalized	immediately,	as	stipulated	in	chapter	10	of	the	
Provisional	Constitution.		It	currently	exists,	but	is	not	truly	functional,	but	once	thoroughly	
established	can	be	the	venue	for	dispute	resolution	for	Federal	Member	States’	(FMS)	to	
resolve	the	various	territorial	conflicts.		Also,	amending	the	Provisional	Constitution’s	criteria	of	
“two	or	more	regions”	as	a	requirement	to	be	a	FMS	to	“one	or	more	regions”	will	ameliorate	
the	current	dilemma	facing	the	emerging	state	of	Galmudug,	and	potentially	Banaadir.		
Even	though	it	is	evident	that	one-person	one-vote	national	election	was	not	attainable	
in	2016,	electoral	democracy	should	still	be	reintroduced	to	Somalia	in	the	next	two	years.		
Instead	of	focusing	on	first	having	a	national	election,	the	FGS	and	UNSOM	should	work	
towards	having	a	one-person	one-vote	regional	election	in	Puntland	State;	this	election	should	
happen	as	soon	as	possible.		Puntland	State	is	the	first	official	Federal	Member	State	(FMS)	of	
the	new	Somalia,	therefore	having	a	successful	one-person	one-vote	election	for	its	regional	
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government	would	signal	to	the	other	regional	states	that	electoral	democracy	is	attainable.		
This	would	make	Puntland	State	the	first	FMS	to	have	one-person	one-vote	election,	and	would	
be	a	symbolic	victory	for	democracy’s	reintroduction	to	Somalia.		There	is	no	better	place	to	
reintroduce	it	than	Puntland.	
One	of	FGS’s	major	goals	was	reached	by	December	2016,	i.e.,	fully	institutionalizing	
Somalia’s	parliament	by	having	an	upper	house.		Somalia’s	parliament	is	supposed	to	be	
bicameral,	but	during	2012-16	functioned	as	a	unicameral	parliament	(the	House	of	the	People	
only	existed).		Like	America’s	Senate,	Somalia’s	Upper	House,	“House	of	the	Federation,"	is	
designed	to	be	the	chamber	where	Federal	Member	States	are	given	equal	number	of	seats	
regardless	of	population	and	territorial	size.					
I	would	recommend	entirely	scrapping	the	idea	of	a	“House	of	the	Federation.”		We	
have	observed	that	ignoring	Somalia’s	traditional	sociopolitical	structure,	while	strictly	
importing	western	models,	does	not	serve	the	Somali	state	adequately.		What	is	needed	is	for	
Somalia’s	Upper	House	to	be	the	chamber	were	clan	representatives	are	institutionalized	(i.e.	
“House	of	Chiefs”).		The	same	135	clan	chiefs	who	appointed	members	to	Somalia’s	
parliamentarian	House	of	the	People	in	2012,	and	appointed	the	14,000	electoral	college	for	
the	2016	election,	should	serve	in	official	capacity	in	the	“House	of	Chiefs.”	The	House	of	Chiefs	
should	have	the	responsibilities	of	stabilizing	clan	disputes,	normalizing	clan	relations,	and	
reserving	traditions.	
The	observations	of	I.M.	Lewis	sheds	further	light:	“if	further	progress	is	to	be	achieved	
in	state-formation,	Somali	politicians	will	surely	have	to	come	out	of	‘denial’	and	start	seriously	
exploring	how	clan	and	lineage	ties	can	be	utilized	positively	.	.	.	Here	a	less	Eurocentric	and	less	
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evolutionary	view	of	lineage	institutions	by	Western	commentators,	social	scientists,	and	
bureaucrats	might	help	to	create	a	more	productive	environment	for	rethinking	clanship	(i.e.	
agnation)	positively.”186		He	further	states	that	“[i]f	the	continuing	force	of	clanship	had	been	
frankly	recognized	and	acknowledged	and	means	sought	to	accommodate	it	politically,	rather	
than	pretending	it	did	not	exist,	things	might	have	turned	out	differently	for	Somalia.”187		If	a	
fully	functioning	and	viable	Somali	state	is	to	permanently	reemerge,	it	is	imperative	to	take	
Somalia’s	traditional	clan	structure	into	account.		The	House	of	Chiefs	will	purposefully	serve	
this	endeavor.			
Finally,	Somalia	must	change	its	4.5	clan	formula	since	it	is	not	based	on	a	scientific	
census	but	rather	clan	discrimination.		Four	clans	are	given	equal	representation	in	the	House	
of	the	People,	sixty-one	seats	each,	while	a	conglomeration	of	“minority	clans”	are	given	half	
representation,	thirty-one	seats.188		I	would	advocate	for	a	5.0	formula	to	give	the	“minority	
clans”	equal	seats	in	the	House	of	the	People	because	the	4.5	formula	is	politically	
discriminatory.			
	 Once	a	post-2016	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	is	in	place,	it	should	focus	on	
accomplishing	the	goals	set	out	in	Vision	2021.		To	complete	these	goals	necessary	steps	must	
be	initially	taken.		
                                                
186 Lewis, I.M. Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox.  Africa (Edinburgh University Press). 2004, 
Vol. 74 Issue 4, pp.508-09. (emphasis added) 
187 Ibid. at 506 
188 Hanson, Stephanie, and Kaplan, Eben.   Somalia's Transitional Government.  Foreign Affairs.  
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475 
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	 The	FGS’s	new	administration,	in	accordance	with	the	various	FMS,	must	prepare	all	
FMS	for	regional	one-person	one-vote	elections	by	2019.		FMS	will	have	their	regional	elections	
at	different	times,	but	must	all	be	accomplished	by	the	second	quarter	of	2019.		This	will	allow	
for	electoral	democracy	to	be	gradually	reintroduced	to	the	entire	Somali	nation	via	a	bottom-
up	approach.		It	will	also	put	in	place	the	necessary	mechanisms	(census,	voter	register,	polling	
stations,	etc.)	for	an	eventual	constitutional	referendum	and	national	one-person	one-vote	
election.		It	should	be	noted	that	these	necessary	mechanisms	are	currently	non-existent	
throughout	Somalia,	a	further	indication	of	the	unrealistic	timetable	imposed	by	the	original	
Vision	2016.			
	 Once	all	Federal	Member	States	have	directly-elected	representatives	for	their	
respective	regional	governments,	a	“Federal	Constitutional	Convention”	should	be	hosted	by	
the	first	quarter	of	2020.		If	Somalia	is	to	complete	her	federal	social	contract,	she	must	iron	out	
the	wrinkles	of	her	style	of	federalism.		What	differentiates	federalism	from	other	forms	of	
government	is	the	dual-sovereign	notion	of	“vertical	separation	of	powers.”		This	notion	
disseminates	governing	powers	between	two	main	entities,	the	federal	government	and	the	
state	governments	(i.e.	Federal	Member	States),	and	each	entity	may	not	encroach	upon	the	
other	entity’s	governing	powers.	
In	the	United	States,	the	federal	government	controls	foreign	affairs,	national	defense,	and	
monetary	policy,	inter	alia,	while	the	state	governments	control	public	health,	safety	(e.g.	
policing),	and	educational	affairs,	inter	alia.		The	dual-sovereign	concept	encompasses	two	
parallel	entities,	federal	and	state,	governing	in	unison.		The	Federal	Government	of	Somalia	
(FGS)	and	the	various	FMS	governments	have	yet	to	properly	negotiate	what	governing	powers	
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are	delegated	to	the	federal	government	and	what	powers	are	reserved	for	state	
governments.		Somalia’s	social	fabric	is	slowly	being	sown	back	together	through	a	federal	
system	and	the	tenets	of	her	vertical	separation	of	powers	must	be	codified.		This	can	only	be	
viably	done	through	a	national	dialogue	between	Somalia’s	various	FMS	stakeholders.			
In	1787,	America’s	thirteen	states	met	in	Philadelphia	for	the	Constitutional	Convention	
(also	known	as	the	Federal	Convention)	to	discuss	how	to	form	a	more	perfect	union.		The	
United	States	Constitution	was	the	brain-child	of	the	convention.		The	convention	addressed	
the	issues	of	federal	delegated	powers	and	reserved	state	powers,	in	addition	to	the	tripartite	
system	of	government	(Legislative,	Executive,	and	Judicial	branches).		Each	state	sent	delegates	
to	the	convention	to	ensure	its	interest	were	properly	represented,	and	these	delegates	
returned	to	their	respective	states	to	lobby	their	citizens	to	vote	in	favor	of	the	new	US	
constitution	in	a	national	referendum.			
A	similar	convention	must	be	held	in	Somalia	to	ensure	Somalis,	of	all	clan	and	regional	
affiliations,	have	their	interests	properly	represented.		This	will	ensure	for	an	all-inclusive	
constitutional	revision	process.		Subsequently,	the	national	referendum	for	Somalia’s	new	
permanent	constitution	should	take	place	by	the	third	quarter	of	2020.			
	 An	additional	goal	of	Vision	2021	is	for	Somalia	to	regain	control	of	her	national	security	
and	policing	powers.		Currently,	the	African	Union	Mission	to	Somalia	(AMISOM)	is	providing	
the	brunt	of	Somalia’s	security,	and	it	is	obvious	that	it	cannot	immediately	leave,	but	also	
cannot	remain	in	the	country	indefinitely.		A	gradual	approach	is	needed.		I	recommend	that	
from	2017	through	2021	all	Federal	Member	States	contribute	an	equal	number	of	recruits	(e.g.	
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5,000	per	regional	state)	for	the	Somali	National	Army.		This	will	allow	for	the	establishment	of	
an	all-inclusive	Somali	National	Army	and	will	allow	AMISOM	to	depart	from	Somalia	by	2021.			
Once	these	goals	are	accomplished,	Somalia	will	finally	be	ready	to	host	its	one-person	one-
vote	national	election	by	first	quarter	of	2021.		To	conclude,	Vision	2021	will	accomplish	the	
following	goals:	(a)	regional	one-person	one-vote	elections	for	all	respective	Federal	Member	
States;	(b)	Federal	Constitutional	Convention	for	purposes	of	constitutional	revision;	(c)	
national	referendum	for	Somalia’s	new	constitution;	(d)	establishment	of	a	fully	functioning	
Somali	National	Army	and	the	withdrawal	of	AMISOM;	and	(e)	one-person	one-vote	national	
election.				
	
	
“[I]n	contrast	to	the	rest	of	Africa	where	states	are	struggling	to	become	nations,	the	Somali	
people	represent	a	nation	struggling	to	become	a	state	.	.	..”	-	Frank	J.	Mahony		
	
